Is It Right to Believe?

It seems to me that many people don’t know what to believe anymore, at least that’s what they tell me. I’ve also met some recently who think they believe, but don’t know why; that’s apparent from their clichéd responses to my query about the basis of their belief. These two groups concern me, but not nearly as much as those who have simply decided not to believe anymore at all.
I’m not talking here about religious beliefs (though what I’ve said clearly applies to many). Rather, I’m talking about beliefs regarding our everyday world in general, but especially about beliefs regarding political discourse, issues, persons, and events. Too many people have become cynical and disillusioned, weary with fatigue and suspicious of politicians and what they say about themselves and their opponents.
For others, their belief system is impenetrable and more than adequate in dismissing contrary opinion and disparaging those who hold different views. The clash that occurs when advocates of incompatible viewpoints encounter one another is calamitous to the observers, and detrimental to their emotional, intellectual, and social health. The bellicose nature of our politics has elevated strident partisanship to new heights, degraded patriotism into tribalism, and diminished the capacity to enact the virtue of civility. It is little wonder then that some don’t know what to believe, while others can’t explain their belief, and still others have abandoned belief altogether and thrown up their hands in disgust.
This situation should not surprise us. In 2008, researchers from several major American universities replicated a study of American voters originally published in 1960 under the title The American Voter (University of Chicago Press, 1960). The more recent replication, entitled The American Voter: Revisited (University of Michigan, 2008), analyzed survey data generated by more recent National Election Studies, and reconfirmed the classification of voters originally identified in the 1960 study. Their taxonomy consists of four groupings.
First, and in terms of levels of political knowledge and experience, we note that some people are deeply immersed in a political ideology to the point where they function not merely as activists but as the spokespersons—the cognitive elite—of their political party and its policy positions. These are the persons who have the prerogative of elucidating the terms and arguments by which a political issue is defined and corresponding positions taken. This group represents 24.53% of voters.
Then there are people whose knowledge and experience are narrower in focus and limited in scope. Rather than thinking generally, deeply, or abstractly about ideological positions and policy issues, these people are oriented to the particular interests of the group or class with which they most identify in terms of race, sexual identity, or social-economic status. Their concern in politics is for enhancing the position and well-being of their group. Issues and candidates that speak to this enhancement are foremost in the minds of these persons, irrespective of political ideology. This group makes up 30.20% of American voters.
Another group consists of people who are little interested in either ideology or group solidarity, but keenly interested in voting for whomever represents the likelihood of improving their overall economic conditions. Given neither to political intellectualizing nor policy wonkishness, individuals in this group desire either a maintenance or recovery of good times; their political sophistication is jejune and their preference for one candidate or party over another is impressionistic. These voters represent 28.93% of the electorate.
Finally, there remains the number of people whose political conceptuality and policy understanding are nonexistent. They neither like nor dislike political parties and candidates at best, or they like all, or dislike all, for trivial reasons at worst. There is little evidence of organization to their political thinking and they are prone to voting for a candidate on the basis of the most superfluous reasons (e.g., some characteristic of the candidate unrelated to his or her party or policy positions). Fully 16.34% of voters fall into this group.
Noticeably missing from this classification scheme is the number of eligible voters who simply do not vote. In the 2016 national election, the U.S. Elections Project reported that 46.9% of eligible voters failed to exercise their right to vote. My fear now is that the malevolence in our politics, the rancor in our discourse, and the jingoism in our associations will dissuade previously-voting citizens from exercising the most sacred right of participation in a democracy, the right to vote. Not knowing what to believe, or knowing why they believe, or simply deciding not to believe is a consequence of the pitiful and contemptable state of our politics.
Journalist James Surowiecki wrote that “real politics is messy and morally ambiguous and doesn’t make for a compelling thriller.” His comment cannot be considered disingenuous, particularly in view of the recent partisan posturing, pretensions, and proclamations surrounding the Senate Supreme Court nomination hearings and the investigation unfolding therefrom. The accusations and counter-accusations surrounding that nomination indicate that the reach of “the political” in our daily lives is far more expansive than perhaps we envisioned. In the wake of these hearings, I recalled an observation George Orwell made in his 1946 article, “Politics and the English Language,” published in Horizon: “In our age there is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics.’ All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia.” Written more than fifty years ago, this is no less true now than then.
To many, it feels like we are in the grip of varying forms of political extremism. No doubt there are deeply committed ideologues in the public square, on both right and left, but they are too cocksure of their beliefs and positions to be given the keys to this house we call the United States. As Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab observe in their book, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970 (Harper & Row, 1970), extremism on the right tends primarily to be a retaliatory reaction to change that dislocates group power and status, while extremism on the left seeks to compel change that dislodges established power and status groups. Thus, political extremism is the politics of despair fueling both radical and reactionary backlash.
But as Lipset and Raab point out, political extremism in any ideological form is “a generalized measure of deviance from the political norm” and “a specific tendency to violate democratic procedures” (4). Indeed, the political forms of extremism we observe in operation today are pressing against, and in some circumstances passing beyond, the boundaries of normality and functionality that have characterized our traditional democratic processes. Civility and propriety and respect are on life-support. It seems we have lost what T.V. Smith and Eduard Lindeman called the “state of mind” that the effective enactment of a democratic government and society requires: “Persons striving to adapt themselves to the democratic way of life are required to discipline themselves to one variety of unity, namely unity which is achieved through the creative use of diversity. A society which is by affirmation democratic is expected to provide and protect a wide range of diversities” (The Democratic Way of Life. Mentor, 1951, p. 91).
Moreover, the omnipresence of what cognitive scientists and social psychologists call “motivated reasoning” has effectively curtailed our capacity to listen to argument and think objectively and critically about both our own beliefs and the policy positions suggested by them. Motivated reasoning in politics is the tendency to look only for evidence that supports or confirms our beliefs and positions. Rooted in the pioneering research of Leon Festinger who developed the theory of cognitive dissonance, the understanding of motivated reasoning or confirmation bias as a corrupt method of inquiry and interpretation has helped us recognize the affective and cognitive distortions and denials at work in our intensified political partisanship. Occasionally it happens that, in our search for information or arguments in support of a preexisting position, we may discover that a conflict—cognitive dissonance—occurs within our thinking for the simple reason that we discern the difference between a realistic, truthful, and fact-based conclusion on the one hand, and the conclusion we would otherwise prefer to buttress our position on the other. But as Andrew Newberg and Mark Waldman note in their book, Born to Believe: God, Science, and the Origin of Ordinary and Extraordinary Beliefs (Free Press, 2006):
Our expectations have a significant influence on what we eventually believe about the world. We come to expect certain things to happen, and we expect people to behave in specific ways. These beliefs are necessary for helping us to deal with the world adaptively and productively….
            However, neither children nor adults have a well-developed capacity to distinguish the accuracy of their own beliefs. In fact, adults are particularly vulnerable with regard to maintaining self-deceptive beliefs, especially when comparing their own intelligence and attractiveness with other people’s (73).
            Lest we believe this form of cognitive disability is peculiarly modern phenomenon, we should note that it was observed by the English philosopher and jurist Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who noted in the first book of Novum Organum:
The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits a tincture of the will and passions, which generate their own system accordingly: for man always believes more readily that which he prefers. He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of nature, from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied with common and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue and corrupt his understanding in innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.
            But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dulness, incompetency, and errors of the senses: since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over every thing, however superior, which does not immediately strike them. Hence contemplation mostly ceases with sight; and a very scanty, or perhaps no regard is paid to invisible objects.
This sentiment is echoed by the French mathematician and theologian Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). In his work, Pensées, he says:
The will is one of the chief organs of belief, not because it creates belief, but because things are true or false according to the aspect by which we judge them. When the will likes one aspect more than another, it deflects the mind from considering the qualities of the one it does not care to see. Thus the mind, keeping in step with the will, remains looking at the aspect preferred by the will and so judges by what it sees there (L539).
Clearly, we are not well served by a cognitive default position or belief system that revolves around the inclination to discredit information that is judged to be contradictory to otherwise inviolable opinions. Either we are immune to critical thinking or we capitulate to those whose presumptive role is to frame and interpret the issues for us, namely the political elite and, increasingly, the ideologically-driven media.
Release from the bondage of this default position is a form of what George Orwell, in another 1946 article, called “intellectual liberty.” In a political context such as ours at present, where dissembling frequently gives way to blatant lying and fabrication of facts, we are increasingly prone simply to disbelieve in the very existence of objective truth. If prevarication becomes the new normal in our political discourse, we shall surely find no reason to seek for and hold to what is real and true; if all our political systems are shrouded in duplicity, we will have surrendered to what Orwell called “organized lying,” or the tyranny of such memes as “fake news,” “alternative facts,” and “truth isn’t truth.” Intellectual liberty entails the freedom to inquire, investigate, criticize, and when necessary, oppose the arduous pull of falsehood.
In politics, as in other areas of human living, we do not have the right to believe anything we want. The reason is that there are consequences to our believing, and sometimes, as now in our politics, our believing is followed by actions that are injurious to others. We do not have the right in politics to believe as true something that has no evidence or warrant; a belief that is unsubstantiated by evidence and argument is both naïve and dangerous. As William K. Clifford argued in his 1877 article, “The Ethics of Belief,” though beliefs may be earnestly and conscientiously held, if they are not the product of patient and deliberate inquiry, they are merely “stolen by listening to the voice of prejudice and passion.” Moreover, it is the action that flows from the belief that becomes the demonstration of the belief’s legitimacy or degeneracy. “For it is not possible,” writes Clifford, “so to sever the belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the other. No man holding a strong belief on one side of a question … can investigate it with such fairness and completeness as if he were really in doubt and unbiased; so that the existence of a belief not founded on fair inquiry unfits a man for the performance of this necessary duty.”
It is wrong to believe on insufficient or falsified evidence, just as it is unethical to suppress evidence by either skepticism or flawed or nonexistent inquiry. As the 5th century Gallic monk, Vincent of Lérins, proposed a rule in his Commonitorium for distinguishing the true Catholic faith from the falsehood of heresy with the aphorism, “that which has been believed everywhere, always, and by all,” so Clifford universalizes a precept for securing the warrant for a belief: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”
We are faced now with a surplus of political stresses over party ideology and policy issues, many of which are quite localized in their expression while others are more widespread. It is not easy to whack our way through the political jungle in search of what is right and just and true. Some believe in justice for all, and others hold to boundaries enclosing parochial and intolerant convictions. Some give precious time over to critical inquiry in order to discern and declare the truth, and others are content to prop up illusions and falsehoods claiming veracity for a ruse that serves principally their self-interests. Still others are simply tired of thinking and choose deliberately to be instructed by the political cognoscenti who monopolize our political discourse and influence the formation of public policy.
It need not be this way. Enacting civic virtue could and should entail seeking that which maximizes the conditions for all members of a society to thrive. Integrity and civility, magnanimity and compassion, generosity and humility, impartiality and mercy, prudence and restraint, tolerance and trust, are truer and more potent sources for the animation of our political literacy and activity. We would do well, whether we identify as religious or not, to follow the lead of the Apostle Paul in determining the discipline and manner of our cogitation at the base our political beliefs: “Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is pleasing, whatever is commendable, if there is any excellence and if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things” (Phil. 4:8), and, I might add, enact them in the pursuit of political aims.
Now is not a time to be heavy-handed or overbearing in the articulation and defense of our beliefs, for by doing so we run the risk of injuring precisely that about which Paul exhorts us to reflect. As Pascal wrote in Pensées, “Our own interest is another wonderful instrument for blinding us agreeably…. Justice and truths are two points so fine that our instruments are too blunt to touch them exactly. If they do make contact, they blunt the point and press all round on the false rather than the true” (L44).

Comments

Unknown said…
I am in the process of leading a women's Bible study on the Minor Prophets. What you say is being said in those messages!! So sad we cannot be civil and kind to one another. Thank you for your gracious way of discussing "hot button" issues!
Lois Heimbaugh said…
We are enduring a presidency unknown to any previous president. We have a president who isn't well informed, doesn't listen to intelligence briefings and lies continuously to "perform" for his base. He doesn't regularly seek any form of communication except Fox News. He is dangerous for the U.S. He is dangerous for the world. As a people, independent of our traditional party support, we have to speak out loud and clear. Our democracy is at risk!

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